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Introduction 
 
The resurgence of the political left in several elections and the political upheavals sweeping 
through the Andean countries in recent years has deepened worries that the gains made in 
transformation in Latin America over the past two decades are in danger. Both phenomena 
powerfully demonstrate the problems plaguing Latin America’s development—problems in which 
socioeconomic and political-institutional factors mutually reinforce each other. Hopes for 
increased stability in development depend upon the regional anchor states of Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico, all three of which were able to consolidate their level of transformation. Regional gaps on 
the subcontinent thus continued to widen: whereas political and economic development slightly 
improved in Brazil and the Cono Sur (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), the five Andean countries 
(Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela) remain the problem countries on the continent.  
Only countries with leaders demonstrating good or very good management could either advance 
transformation or at the bare minimum, stay their course in spite of significant challenges. The 
latter is especially true for the small countries, which, due to their economic structures and 
vulnerability to world markets, are particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the global economy 
(Uruguay, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, El Salvador). Conversely, Haiti, Venezuela 
and authoritarian Cuba demonstrated clear failures in management and they continue to pose 
problems for transformation in Latin America.  
In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez consolidated his power after surviving a putsch and a major general 
strike in 2002. He also won a successful mandate to continue his presidency in a constitutionally 
binding referendum held in 2004. Since 2003, Chávez has taken Brazilian President Lula da 
Silva’s place as the key cult figure of the anti-globalization movement and critics of neo-liberalism. 
In fact, increasing uneasiness with the neo-liberal model of development was felt throughout Latin 
America while the region’s political elites placed emphasis on new free trade agreements 
(particularly with the United States).  
This report provides an overview on the state, trajectory and management of the transformation 
processes in the 21 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is based on the results of the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 (BTI) and the underlying country assessments which 
analyze each individual country in detail. 
Democratic Development 
Despite the somewhat spectacular events in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, democracy in Latin 
America remains stable. However, the region’s most serious problems have deepened and are 
becoming increasingly visible. These problems are the consequence of insufficient economic 
reforms, enormous social inequity and the lack of stable institutions in the region’s predominantly 
defective democracies. The lack of social progress made, coupled with the massive social 
demands articulated and the attractiveness of populism, constitutes a danger not to be ignored by 
the international community.  
In general, Latin American democracies continue to suffer from a state monopoly on the use of 
force that is only partially secured, insufficient administrative structures and, most importantly, 
deficiencies in the rule of law. The region’s prospects for stability are limited by the periodically 
poor performance of democratic institutions, but most of all by weak mediation between state and 
society and problems of empowerment in democratic civil societies. These weaknesses are 
linked to the continent’s social troubles, particularly the problems of acute inequity and the 
concomitant imbalanced class structures found in most Latin American societies. 
Table 1: The Quality of Democracies in Latin America  




               
Uruguay  Brasil  Peru  Colombia  Cuba  
Costa Rica  Argentina  Honduras  Guatemala  Haiti  
      Bolivia        
Chile  Mexico  Nicaragua        
   Panama  Paraguay        
Jamaica              
   El Salvador  Ecuador        
   Dominican Rep.  Venezuela        
               
Countries are listed according to classifications derived from the BTI scale and according to their 
BTI score in the status index for political transformation.  
The quality of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean varies significantly. Uruguay, Costa 
Rica, Chile and Jamaica represent a group of stable, well-functioning democracies under the rule 
of law. The bulk of Latin American countries are categorized as defective democracies with 
relatively stable political institutions. Civil liberties in these countries are limited by deficiencies in 
stateness and the rule of law. Haiti and Cuba have been classified as autocracies. Triggered by 
external pressure, President Aristide’s demise in Haiti resulted in dramatic changes that could 
lead to renewed democratic transformation. However, scant political and social progress one year 
after Aristide’s removal and the deployment of UN troops underscores the difficulty to establish 
more stable political conditions. To date, no free and fair elections have been held in Haiti. On the 
other hand, the Castro dictatorship on Cuba has further stabilized—in part due to Venezuelan 
President Chávez’s support—and shows no signs of democratic change.  
The strengths and weaknesses of Latin America’s political systems remained essentially 
unchanged. Deficiencies in most countries’ stateness continue to represent a fundamental 
obstacle to democratic and market economic transformation. Apart from guerilla warfare and the 
civil war currently affecting Colombia only, the state’s monopoly on the use of force is increasingly 
“privatized” in the remaining countries (excepting Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Jamaica, and 
Cuba). The problem results from the combination of insufficient state protection of the 
underprivileged, the penetration of the state apparatus by organized crime and the drug mafia’s 
unrestrained expansion. These phenomena can be observed most clearly in Mexico, where 
despite the palpable political will to advance reform, police, military, public prosecutor’s office and 
the judiciary are still so thoroughly penetrated by organized crime that the line distinguishing 
those protecting and those infringing upon the law is blurred.  
In Brazil as well, groups with close ties to the drug mafia continue to operate as parallel structures 
to the state and undermine the state’s ability to provide security. Paraguay and Central America 
in particular are affected by the problem of transnational criminal youth gangs whose activities 
have increased in recent years. The growing trend of transnational organized (drug) crime 
associated with weak state power has also continued in the Caribbean, which has become an 
important transfer point in drug smuggling.  
No progress was made in enhancing the rule of law, which persists as the greatest weak spot in 
Latin American democracies. Only Uruguay, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Chile may be considered 
democracies under the rule of law. To differing degrees, the remaining countries are plagued by 
malfunctioning checks and balances, insufficient independence of the judiciary, and limits to civil 
liberties. This leads on the one hand to a lack of control over political power (Argentina) and on 
the other hand to a ‘low intensity citizenship’ for many citizens and/or the state’s inability to 
guarantee citizens’ fundamental rights (Guatemala). These negative trends are strengthened by 
the endemic levels of corruption in nearly all the region’s countries.  
The central obstacle to the overall stability of democracy in Latin America lies in the extent to 
which democracy is socio-politically embedded. In other words, the quality of the structures of 
representation, the vigor of civil societies supporting democracy and the pervasiveness of 
democratic standards is crucial to the stability of democracy. Only Uruguay and Costa Rica and 
to some extent Chile enjoy this stabilizing environment. In contrast, different combinations of 
weak civil societies, unconsolidated civic cultures and unstable structures of political 
representation are seen in each of the remaining countries.  
Weaknesses in structures of representation and, more importantly, in political party systems 
affect primarily Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and Guatemala. In these countries the 
democratic institutions are in danger to be damaged under the pressure of massive social 
demands. A similar problem could emerge in Argentina, where the public’s alienation from the 
political elite has yet to be resolved. The country’s established political parties have failed to 
undergo sufficient reform, and no new elite has emerged from the crisis as of yet. Haiti and 
especially Cuba face the problem that their still virtual processes of transition will be endangered 
from their inception by fragile modes of representation.  
The region’s predominantly weak civil societies are to be regarded as hurdles to democratic 
consolidation. For example, Bolivia and Ecuador’s so-called popular putsches or "golpe popular" 
are deceptive in that they seem to suggest the presence of powerful civil societies in these 
countries. In fact however, they point to the threatening spread of anti-institutional policy. These 
movements undermine rather than solidify the foundations of democracy. Self-organizing civil 
societies that facilitate consolidation and a stable civic culture are found only in those countries 
with either a long democratic tradition and/or a relatively advanced level of development (these 
include Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile, as well as Argentina, Brazil and Jamaica). 
Market Economic Development  
After the so-called “six lost years” (sexenio perdido, 1997-2003), the national economies of Latin 
America recovered as they gained from favorable global economic trends from 2003 to 2005. As 
exporters of oil and natural gas, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia benefited from increased prices 
for raw materials. The fact that this boom period did not help them achieve any political stability 
whatsoever demonstrates the risk to which most countries knowingly expose themselves: Instead 
of using a relatively favorable international climate to advance reforms and invest in their 
economic future, these countries recklessly squander their ability to act, as was the case in 
Argentina and Mexico. Due to recent increases in world market prices, Latin America faces the 
risk of once again becoming an exporter of raw materials, with all of its concomitant political and 
economic problems. Most Latin American governments have yet to find a solution to this problem, 
which is linked to the opening of Asian markets, their growing strength in the manufacturing 
sector, and the strong demand for raw materials. Discussions regarding a more consistent 
development model, initiated first in the early 1990s by the UN Economic Commission CEPAL, 
must resume in Latin America—especially in light of the continent’s meager social development.  
Political forces calling for increased state intervention have actually grown in some Latin 
American countries due to the poor track record of economic and social development. Social and 
political unrest in Bolivia, where some citizen movements have demanded gas production be 
nationalized, is symptomatic of these new trends. Following President Chávez’ referendum 
victory, calls for state intervention has increased in Venezuela as well. Chávez' political and 
economic liaison with Castro and other foreign policy initiatives point to a strategy aimed at 
spreading his brand of anti-neo-liberalism. It remains unclear whether these currents will spread 
to other countries in the region, such as Ecuador or Peru, and whether the traditionally acute 
social inequity will combine with populism to an increased danger to market economic 
development ("Latino disease"). To date, regional heavyweights Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and 
Chile maintain the course of market economic transformation in Latin America. 











market economy  
Chile  Costa Rica  Mexico     Venezuela  
   Brazil  Panama  Dominican Rep.  Guatemala  
      El Salvador  Bolivia     
   Uruguay  Argentina  Honduras  Cuba  
      Colombia  Nicaragua     
    Jamaica  Paraguay     
      Peru  Ecuador  Haiti  
Countries are listed according to classifications derived from the BTI scale and according to their 
BTI score in the Status Index for economic transformation.  
On the whole, the patterns of market economic transformation observed in the 2003 BTI have 
continued through the period under review. Enjoying a solid economic regime and strong 
performance, Chile maintained its position at the top as a relatively well-developed market 
economy. Three other countries—Costa Rica, Brazil and Uruguay—may also be classified as 
having functioning and/or performing market economies. Despite growing problems, Costa Rica 
and Uruguay were able to stabilize their economy’s performance and preserve relatively socially-
balanced economic structures. Unlike Argentina, Uruguay lived up to the confidence expressed in 
it by the international financial community, the crisis of 2002/03 notwithstanding.  
However, the majority of market economies in Latin America do not function well. This larger 
group is divided into two sub-groups of countries marked by qualitatively distinct development 
dynamics and prospects. The first sub-group includes on the one hand, small countries with a 
coherent regulatory framework, but relatively limited economic performance (Panama, Jamaica, 
El Salvador), and on the other hand, countries less dependent on market fluctuations thanks 
simply to the size of their economies (Mexico, Colombia). Having stabilized its economy after the 
2001/2002 crisis, Argentina has rejoined the ranks of this group. However, it has yet to use its 
development level and its growth potential to effect a greater leap in transformation. In the second 
sub-group, market economic transformation continues to stagnate—albeit for a variety of reasons. 
In addition to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, this sub-group includes two countries from 
the Andes region and Central America each. All these countries suffer from a continuing high 
incidence of poverty, moderate development levels, a large informal sector and other major 
structural deficits (infrastructure, social security systems).  
Venezuela, Guatemala, Haiti and Cuba remain far behind in terms of market economic 
development. Cuba’s relatively high level of development (based on HDI indicators) continues in 
the absence of any meaningful institutional framework for a market economy. Indeed, trends 
liberalizing some aspects of its state-controlled economy, such as in foreign trade and monetary 
transactions (dollar), have been reversed in the last two years. Nevertheless, Cuba was able to 
further stabilize its economy with assistance from Venezuela. Aside from the country’s improved 
economic performance, Cuba’s environmental, educational and technological sustainability are to 
be lauded. Thus far however, insufficient use has been made of the country’s development 
potential.  
Venezuela’s unnecessarily bleak situation may be attributed directly to specific political decisions 
that the BTI characterizes as failed transformation management. This oil-rich country continues to 
profit from its immense oil revenues, but increasingly shows the hallmarks of a rent-seeking 
economy. In fact, the basic institutional framework has deteriorated over the past two years as a 
risky budgetary policy, an inadequate stability policy and restrictions to the central bank’s 
autonomy demonstrate. Consequently, the prospects for Venezuela’s private sector have 
weakened and investment has dropped drastically. The growing structural deficits exacerbated by 
populist budgetary policies may again lead to drastic macroeconomic adjustment policies in the 
medium-term.  
All over the region, arrangements needed to ensure social equity and sustainability are 
insufficient and exacerbate the problem of limited development prospects for large parts of the 
population. With the exception of Costa Rica, Uruguay and, to a certain extent, Chile, welfare 
regimes in place throughout the region are generally rudimentary and appear to cement rather 
than alleviate social differences. In terms of sustainability, the lack of public spending on 
education in particular serves to increase and prolong the effects of inequity, as the best 
educational facilities are often private institutions. In Chile, this education deficit is regarded as its 
Achilles’ heel to future success; yet despite increased spending, very little improvement has been 
registered. 
Transformation Management 
With the exception of Cuba, Latin America is the only region aside from Eastern Europe in which 
transformation management, since its inception in the 1980s, has been aimed in principle toward 
market economic and democratic reforms simultaneously. The difficulties inherent to achieving 
these dual goals simultaneously are exacerbated by the fact that reforms must be implemented in 
the face of firmly established interest groups with the capacity to block new policies. In recent 
years, new social movements have emerged in some countries (e.g. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador) 
and mobilized, sometimes radically, to resist further economic reforms. Particularly in those 
countries where transformation efforts have stalled, the prospects for reform appear bleak once 
again.  
A comparison of the BTI values given for transformation management in Latin America presents a 
highly heterogeneous image. The transformation management of slightly more than one-third of 
the countries was rated as good or very good, while only four states clearly demonstrated poor 
governance. Between these two groups lies another in which nearly half of the countries are 
classified. In this median group, political elites demonstrated only partial success and in general 
proved incapable of setting a fundamentally new agenda. Argentina is emblematic of this limited 
dynamism, as it has undergone a recovery since 2003 under President Kirchner, but none of the 
needed economic and social reforms have been implemented. 
















               
Chile  Uruguay  Argentina  Ecuador     
   Brazil  Bolivia  Venezuela  Haiti  
   Costa Rica  Dominican Rep.     Cuba  
      Peru        
   El Salvador  Colombia        
   Mexico  Honduras        
   Jamaica  Nicaragua        
   Panama  Guatemala        
      Paraguay        
               
Countries are listed according to classifications derived from the BTI scale and according to their 
BTI score in the Status Index for political transformation.  
Table 3 also shows several shifts in the quality of management as compared to the 2003 BTI. 
Chile succeeded in maintaining its rather lonely position at the top, while Uruguay and Costa Rica 
dropped from the group of top performers. Their fall can be attributed to the fact that both 
countries failed to make effective use of their resources. In Costa Rica, a weakened ability to 
build consensus in the face of growing social crises was also a factor. El Salvador and Mexico’s 
upgrade into the same group is attributed to their marked ability to engage in international 
cooperation. In contrast, the median group’s four newcomers owe their upgrade to improved 
management in nearly all categories. It must be noted that, unlike the 2003 BTI, each of these 
four countries had new governments to be evaluated and that they revitalized transformation in 
their respective countries:  
· In Colombia, which is plagued by civil war, a difficult political process began under 
President Uribe that was designed to overcome the deadlock in the violent conflict left by 
his predecessor, Pastrana. Despite the multidimensional challenges facing Uribe, he has 
achieved some success. However, several of his measures are controversial, particularly 
in terms of democratic development, and there is doubt as to whether his strategy will 
lead to a functioning market-based democracy in the long-term.  
· The Bolaños government in Nicaragua owes its relatively high score primarily to its skills 
in international cooperation, which the country demonstrated to international development 
agencies particularly during the PRSP process and with the HIPC Debt Relief Initiative. 
Nicaragua’s management score could have been higher, as Bolaños also convincingly 
pursued political reform. Indeed, his efforts led to the conviction of former President 
Alemán on charges of corruption. However, Alemán succeeded in avoiding punishment 
with the help of an agreement with the Sandinista leader Ortega. Essentially all 
substantial government initiatives were blocked and thus rendered the government 
incapable of taking action.  
· Since assuming office in August 2003, Paraguay’s President Duarte has overcome the 
rather muted success of his predecessor, González Macchi. The government 
immediately implemented several important proposed reforms (particularly in tax and 
social security policies) and began—in one of the most corrupt countries in the world—
the fight against corruption in administration and the judiciary. The Duarte government 
also proved exceedingly more successful than all preceding governments in shaping 
international cooperation. This is all the more impressive when considering the fact that 
the government must act within the framework of a “divided government.”  
· In Guatemala, the Berger government also shows only moderate management 
performance, yet it nonetheless demonstrates a clear improvement from its predecessor, 
Portillo. In contrast to Portillo, the Berger government has demonstrated, at least 
occasionally, a greater capacity for international cooperation. However, this trend is not 
particularly stable, as is the case with other reform trends in Guatemala. Consequently, 
Guatemala remains a potential site of crisis in Latin America, especially after the end of 
the UN mission (MINUGUA).  
The gap between these relative success stories and those featuring clear failures of management 
is wide. A particularly dramatic example of regression is seen in Ecuador, where former military 
rebel Gutiérrez took over the presidency and the government in January 2003. Compared with his 
predecessor Noboa and his governance, political management under Gutiérrez deteriorated in all 
areas. Despite a recovering economy facilitated by the oil boom, Gutiérrez, who took office under 
the slogan of "good governance," failed to implement any of his proposed plans. Instead, he 
resorted to the corrupt government policies of his predecessors and sought to outmaneuver 
democratic institutions. Following protracted protests, Gutiérrez was removed from power in 
March 2005.  
Moderate success in the efficient use of resources continues to pose one of the greatest 
obstacles to significant gains in transformation. This moderate success is observed in all three 
indicators of resource efficiency: the inefficient use of financial and human resources, the inability 
to coordinate conflicting objectives, and limitations in fighting corruption. Only Chile can be 
compared in this respect with the top performers in Eastern Europe, or even with South Korea 
and Taiwan. Among the generally weak scores given for efficiency, one is particularly weak, 
namely the values given for fighting corruption. Corruption continues to represent one of the most 
significant obstacles to democratic and market economic progress. Only Chile, and to some 
extent Uruguay and Costa Rica, fight corruption earnestly. In all the other countries, public 
awareness has grown, as has awareness among at least some of the political elite. However, to 
date, integrity mechanisms in nearly all of the region’s countries continue to function poorly or not 
at all. Even international organizations such as the World Bank, with their repeated calls to fight 
corruption, have acted thus far with little consistency and have sometimes exacerbated the 
inefficient use of resources. 
Summary 
Democratic and market economic progress in Latin America has been limited in recent years. 
This may be attributed in part to the fact that Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile had already 
achieved a relatively high level of transformation. Unfortunately however, most countries have 
shown stagnation and even regression in transformation. The staying-power of "illiberal defects" 
in most democracies poses the greatest problem and is linked with the difficulty in implementing a 
functioning rule of law.  
With respect to market economic transformation, there were, on the one hand, visible signs of 
consolidation. On the other hand, there were also open conflicts over the social parameters of 
such consolidation. In Bolivia, this led to the sharpest domestic conflict about the “right” way 
between the market and the state which Latin America has seen in nearly twenty-five years. The 
key protagonists of this movement include certain social movements (primarily in Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Peru) along with Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro. It remains doubtful, however, whether this is 
announcing a paradigm shift in Latin American economic policy.  
In terms of transformation management, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and, more recently, Brazil 
stand out in Latin America. Increasingly stable structures of good governance have emerged in 
these countries, increasing their ability to safeguard their democracies from neo-populist 
challenges. Apart from these, however, good governance in Latin America remains 
underappreciated among politicians and also often among citizens. Sporadic eruptions of public 
anger in dramatic events, like those observed in Argentina in recent years, soon give way to a 
general sense of lethargy. The slogan "Que se vay an todos" ("Out with them all!"), which 
heralded the Argentinian crisis of 2001, has been reduced to an empty cry, as nearly all of the 
politicians have remained at their posts. For some countries, this could lead to increased social 
unrest which will question the governability, as is the case already in Bolivia and Peru. 
Results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 for and the Caribbean and Latin 
America  
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